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WAIVING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN DELAWARE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES 
Winnifred A. Lewis* 
 
In corporations, like most other business associations, fiduciary duties 
exist to deter management from abusing their power over the owners’ 
property.  In Delaware limited partnerships and limited liability companies, 
this protection can be waived in the operating agreement.  This Note 
explores the effects of retaining or waiving fiduciary duties and how this 
plays out in the interpretation of operating agreements.  It argues that 
default fiduciary duties exist for limited liability companies and limited 
partnerships, including those that are member managed, and it proposes a 
combination of disclosure and signature requirements from each limited 
partner or member in order for waiver of fiduciary duties to be effective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, Gatz Properties LLC, Auriga Capital Corporation, and several 
minority investors formed Peconic Bay, a Delaware limited liability 
company (LLC).1  Peconic Bay was created to develop a golf course.2  To 
do so, it leased property from the Gatz family and then sublet to American 
Golf Corporation, a golf course development company.3  Peconic Bay was 
governed by an LLC agreement that designated Gatz Properties as manager 
and allocated voting in such a way as to give Gatz Properties control.4  Gatz 
Properties, in turn, was managed and controlled by William Gatz.5 
The golf course venture was never profitable.6  By 2005, Gatz knew 
American Golf would elect to terminate the sublease in 2010,7 effectively 
ending Peconic Bay’s only source of revenue.  In 2007, in anticipation of 
American Golf’s decision, Gatz commissioned an appraisal of the 
 
 1. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1208 (Del.), 
aff’g 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1209. 
 4. Id. at 1208–09. 
 5. Id. at 1208. 
 6. Id. at 1209. 
 7. See id. 
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property.8  The appraiser valued the land with golf course improvements at 
$10.1 million and as vacant land available for development at $15 million.9 
Later that year, another golf course development company, RDC Golf 
Group, expressed interest in acquiring Peconic Bay’s long-term lease.10  
Gatz refused to permit due diligence and criticized RDC’s revenue 
projections as overly optimistic.11  RDC submitted a nonbinding offer to 
acquire Peconic Bay’s ground lease and American Golf’s sublease for $3.75 
million.12  The offer was rejected by a membership vote, controlled by 
Gatz, as was a second offer of $4.15 million.13  RDC again raised its level 
of interest, this time to $6 million,14 but Gatz did not respond to this 
approach.15 
Instead, Gatz offered to purchase Peconic Bay’s minority interests 
himself for the amount the minority investors would receive if Peconic 
Bay’s assets were sold for $5.6 million.16  Gatz did not inform the minority 
investors of his failure to respond to RDC’s offer of $6 million.17  The 
minority holders nonetheless rejected Gatz’s offer.18 
Gatz then hired an appraiser for Peconic Bay, but he gave the appraiser 
incomplete information.19  Using only American Golf’s historical financial 
data, the appraiser found that Peconic Bay had no net positive value.20  Gatz 
then proposed to sell Peconic Bay at auction.21  After a desultory marketing 
effort, Gatz was the only bidder, and he purchased Peconic Bay.22  The 
minority members collectively received $20,985.23  The auctioneer received 
$80,000 for his services.24 
After the auction, the minority investors brought suit against Gatz based 
on his active mismanagement of Peconic Bay.25  Intuitively, it would seem 
Gatz should be held liable.  Under either a partnership or a corporate law 
schema of fiduciary duties, Gatz had clearly breached his duty of loyalty to 
the minority members;26 under LLC law, however, the success of such a 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1209–10. 
 14. Id. at 1210. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1211. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1212.  Compare this to the $734,131 the minority investors would have 
received had they accepted Gatz’s earlier offer to buy them out, which presumably was 
already a low bid. Id. at 1210. 
 24. Id. at 1212. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See infra notes 49, 77–84, 112–19 and accompanying text. 
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suit depended on the LLC agreement.27  Peconic Bay, as a Delaware LLC, 
could eliminate all fiduciary duties in the operating agreement,28 but 
Peconic Bay’s LLC agreement arguably did not directly address the 
existence or contours of the fiduciary duties that Gatz owed to Peconic 
Bay’s members.29  In the face of silence or ambiguity, what, if any, legal 
duties constrained Gatz’s conduct? 
Clarity and predictability of these duties has grown in importance as 
LLCs and limited partnerships (LPs) have grown increasingly popular.30  
There is now a significantly greater number of LLCs being formed annually 
than corporations, both nationally,31 and in Delaware.32  In Delaware, in 
2011, three times as many LLCs as corporations were formed.33  There is 
an increasing number of LPs in Delaware as well, although the jump is not 
as dramatic.34 
Not only is the increasing number making these entities more important, 
but so is the amount of capital and type of firm which typically selects these 
as their form of organization.  Limited partnerships are increasingly the 
organization of choice for private equity firms, venture capital firms, and 
hedge funds.35  As of the first quarter of 2012, the hedge fund industry was 
comprised of approximately 7,659 firms, with an aggregate capital of more 
than two trillion dollars.36  Publicly traded LPs and LLCs have billions of 
dollars in assets.37  As a result of this growth, the legal contours of fiduciary 
 
 27. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 856 (Del. 
Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
 30. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law:  A Theory of 
Contractability and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 191 & n.10 (2011). 
 31. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill:  An Empirical Study 
of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 
2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 459, 473 tbl.I-D (2010) (providing empirical data illustrating that, compared to 
corporations, two times more LLCs were formed in 2007 in the United States). 
 32. See DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2011), available at 
http://corp.delaware.gov/2011CorpAR.pdf (providing a graph of New Business Formations 
from 2009–2011, showing formation of Delaware LLCs outpacing that of corporations three 
to one in 2011). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
289, 298–300 (2009). 
 36. See Eric Uhlfelder, Best 100 Hedge Funds, BARRON’S (May 19, 2012), 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111904571704577404264215025458.html
#articleTabs_article%3D1. 
 37. In 2012, Delaware was home to eighty-five publicly traded LPs and LLCs. See 
Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law:  Evidence 
from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 598 (2012).  These are primarily oil 
and gas companies and coal, mineral, and timber companies, although there are also a few 
investment and financial management firms. See id. at 599–603 app.A; see also PTPs 
Currently Traded on U.S. Exchanges, NAT’L ASS’N OF PUBLICLY TRADED P’SHIPS, 
http://naptp.org/PTP101/CurrentPTPs.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing all currently 
publicly traded partnerships, totaling 101 limited partnerships and fourteen limited liability 
companies). 
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duties in these entities are gaining increasing significance.38  When 
someone like Gatz is managing billions of dollars, there is arguably more at 
stake, both for the investors and the market at large. 
In Delaware, the applicability of fiduciary duties to these entities depends 
on the language of the operating agreement.39  The Delaware Court of 
Chancery has emphasized the existence of so-called “default” fiduciary 
duties—shorthand for duties arising from equity and common law that exist 
in the absence of contractual modification by the parties.40  The Chancery 
Court found Gatz liable for violating his fiduciary duties to Peconic Bay’s 
minority members,41 but the Delaware Supreme Court did not share this 
view.42  While the Delaware Supreme Court held Gatz liable for his 
conduct, it did so on contractual grounds.43 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling raised questions of whether, when, 
and how default fiduciary duties apply to limited liability companies.44  The 
debate over the wisdom of implying these duties continues.45  While recent 
Delaware legislation seems to have clarified the existence of default 
fiduciary duties, at least in certain circumstances, the applicability of these 
duties remains undefined. 
This Note explores recent Delaware case law regarding fiduciary duties 
in LPs and LLCs.  Part I begins by reviewing the origins of fiduciary duties 
and their application in Delaware business law.  It then outlines the history 
of LPs and LLCs and examines how fiduciary duties function in the context 
 
 38. According to at least one list, two recent cases concerning default fiduciary duties in 
LLCs and LPs made the top five key corporate and commercial cases of 2012. See Francis 
G.X. Pileggi & Kevin F. Brady, Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions in 
2012, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/
2013/01/articles/annual-review-of-cases/key-delaware-corporate-and-commercial-decisions-
in-2012/. 
 39. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 849–56 (Del. 
Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
 41. Id. at 875. 
 42. The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion was passionate enough to make the news. 
See, e.g., Del. High Court to Chancery Chief:  Keep World Views to Yourself, REUTERS.COM 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 8:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/delaware-law-strine-
idUSL1E8M7P8620121108; Peter Lattman, In Unusual Move, Delaware Supreme Court 
Rebukes a Judge, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 9, 2012, 8:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2012/11/09/in-unusual-move-the-delaware-supreme-court-rebukes-a-judge/; Gordon 
Smith, Delaware Infighting, CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.
org/2012/11/delaware-infighting.html. 
 43. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1208. 
 44. See, e.g., Michael C. Hefter & Ryan M. Philip, The Debate Rages on Regarding 
Whether Default Fiduciary Duties Apply to LLC Managers Under Delaware Law, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/debate-rages-regarding-whether-
default-fiduciary-duties-apply-to-llc-managers-under-; Carl Neff, Delaware Supreme Court 
Declines To Hold that Default Fiduciary Duties Are Owed in LLCs, DEL. CT. OF CHANCERY 
PRAC. BLOG (Dec. 30, 2012), http://delawarechancery.foxrothschild.com/fiduciary-
duties/delaware-supreme-court-declines-to-hold-that-default-fiduciary-durites-are-owed-in-
llcs/. 
 45. See, e.g., On-Line Symposium:  Default Fiduciary Duties in LLCs and LPs, 
WIDENER L., http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/on-line-symposium-default-fiduciary-
duties-in-llcs-and-lps/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
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of these unincorporated firms.  Part II outlines the conflicting arguments 
regarding whether default fiduciary duties should apply in LLCs and LPs, 
contrasting the traditionalist view with the contractarian.  Part III argues 
that default fiduciary duties apply to both LLCs and LPs, including those 
that are member managed.  This Note then contends that a combination of 
disclosure and signatures should be required in order to waive fiduciary 
duties. 
I.  FROM FUNDAMENTAL TO DISPOSABLE:   
FIDUCIARY DUTIES, LLCS, AND LPS 
Part I discusses the origins of fiduciary duties and outlines their 
application in the context of Delaware business law.  Next, it explains the 
history and structure of LLCs and LPs.  It then explores how fiduciary 
duties apply to these entities. 
A.  Fiduciary Duties and Their Role in Business Associations 
This section first describes the equitable origins of fiduciary duties and 
then gives an overview of their application in the context of corporations. 
1.  The Equitable Origins of Fiduciary Duties 
At their foundation, fiduciary relationships are characterized by one 
person placing special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another.46  
Typical examples of such relationships are trustees managing assets for 
beneficiaries,47 agents acting on behalf of principals,48 and partners 
working together on a joint venture.49 
The law recognizes each of these as a special circumstance and provides 
protection by imposing special duties on the person acting on the other’s 
behalf.50  The law imposes a heightened duty of care and fidelity on this 
person.51  This was famously articulated by Justice Cardozo, writing that 
business partners are “held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
 
 46. See, e.g., Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 661 (Del. Ch. 2012) (quoting 
Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. 13929, 1995 WL 409015, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. July 5, 1995)). 
 47. See, e.g., Keech v. Sandford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch.) (imposing heightened 
duties on a trustee managing a lease for beneficiary); A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 17.2.7 
n.2 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing application of Keech in the United States). 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (2006) (discussing fiduciary 
character of agency relationship). 
 49. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to 
those bound by fiduciary ties.”). 
 50. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:  Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991); see 
also id. at 1046 n.3 (discussing paradigmatic forms of fiduciary relationships). 
 51. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY, AND PARTNERSHIP:  DUTIES 
IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 2 (1991); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An 
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882. 
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sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”52  These fiduciary duties can 
never be waived—they are an intrinsic part of each of these legal 
relationships.53 
While to an extent there is a moral aspect to the imposition of these 
duties54—to not damage, steal, or waste what was given in trust—there are 
economic reasons for these duties, as well.55  A result of trust in, and 
reliance on, another is the separation of ownership and control.56  The 
person who owns the property gives it to another person to manage.57  The 
manager thus controls the property and does what he must in order to make 
the property productive.58  His obligations are open ended, as each decision 
that would make the property productive cannot be thought of in advance.59  
The owner, by contrast, is not involved; he holds legal ownership, but that 
is all.60  What is difficult for the owner to know is what the manager is 
doing day to day.61  How then can the owner keep the manager from 
misconduct? 
Fiduciary duties are “formulated . . . proscriptive rules of fiduciary 
conduct.”62  Thus the manager knows ahead of time what he can and cannot 
do.  Since both manager and owner know from the outset that fiduciary 
rules govern, these duties deter managerial abuse.63  By deterring 
managerial abuse, these duties decrease agency costs—the costs of 
monitoring management in these relationships.64 
2.  Corporate Directors Are Fiduciaries 
The directors of a corporation are fiduciaries because they manage the 
corporation for the benefit of the shareholders.65  In their managerial roles, 
 
 52. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546. 
 53. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 54. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 104 (2011). 
 55. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 49, at 1046. 
 56. See FRANKEL, supra note 54, at 4–6. 
 57. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 49, at 1048. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1046–47, 1059 (“Because asset management necessarily involves risk and 
uncertainty, the specific behavior of the fiduciary cannot be dictated in advance.”). 
 60. Id. at 1048. 
 61. See id. at 1047. 
 62. Id. at 1054; see also DEMOTT, supra note 51, at 9 (“The fiduciary principle is an 
alternative to direct monitoring.”). 
 63. DEMOTT, supra note 51, at 8–9. 
 64. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. 
& ECON. 425, 432 (1993); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
308 (1976), available at http://business.illinois.edu/josephm/BA549_Fall%202012/
Session%205/5_Jensen_Meckling%20(1976).pdf (defining and discussing agency costs). 
 65. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 309; see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–31 (rev. ed. 1968) 
(discussing the rise of the modern corporation and the separation of ownership and control). 
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directors have fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.66  
While the proscriptive rules of conduct under general fiduciary law are 
fairly broad and undefined,67 Delaware has a sophisticated and developed 
body of case law addressing corporate directors’ fiduciary duties.68  These 
duties generally fall into two categories:  the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty.69 
a.  The Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires directors to manage the business with the “care 
which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar 
circumstances.”70  The Delaware Supreme Court has construed this to mean 
directors must consider “all material information reasonably available to 
them” before making a business decision.71  Under the business judgment 
rule, courts presume that a director’s business judgment was made “on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company.”72  Thus, a director must commit 
an act of gross negligence before he will have breached the duty of care.73 
Corporations may adopt a charter amendment that exculpates directors 
from monetary liability arising from a breach of the duty of care.74  While 
this would remove the deterrent penalty of personal liability, adoption of a 
charter amendment requires a shareholder vote—the managers cannot 
unilaterally exculpate themselves without the owners’ informed consent.75  




 66. 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 141.2.1 (5th ed. Supp. II 2011); see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90 (1991). 
 67. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 50, at 1045–46; see also EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 90–91. 
 68. See 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 66, § 141.2 (discussing directors’ fiduciary duties 
under Delaware law). 
 69. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) 
(noting that the duty to act in good faith is not separate from the two core duties of loyalty 
and care). 
 70. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 71. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 72. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 881. 
 74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).  The board is also statutorily 
protected when relying on records and on opinions from specialists in the ordinary course of 
business in order to discharge their duties. Id. § 141(e). 
 75. See id. § 242(b)(1). 
 76. See id. § 102(b)(7). 
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b.  The Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty is the duty of fidelity to the corporation and its 
shareholders.77  This includes the duty to act in good faith.78  Though 
generally shareholders owe no duties to each other, controlling shareholders 
(ones that can control a necessary vote) are also subject to the duty of 
loyalty.79  Under the duty of loyalty, directors and controlling shareholders 
must avoid “any conflict between duty and self-interest.”80  Any self-
dealing on the part of a director or a controlling shareholder will be subject 
to careful scrutiny of intrinsic fairness.81  For example, in a merger, the 
duty of loyalty requires the transaction to pass a two-prong entire fairness 
test consisting of fair price and fair dealing.82  A conflicted transaction can 
be ratified by a vote of disinterested directors or by a vote of the 
shareholders.83  Liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty can never be 
exculpated, even with shareholder consent.84 
B.  The History and Structure of LPs and LLCs 
This section will review the genesis and characteristics of limited 
partnerships and limited liability companies. 
1.  Limited Partnerships 
In contrast to corporations, which originally had to be chartered by the 
monarch in order to exist,85 partnerships originated as agreements among 
individuals.86  In that respect, their origins resemble contracts.87  
Partnerships are associations of two or more persons who are co-owners of 
a business.88  There is an agency relationship between partners to act on 
 
 77. 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 66, § 141.2.1.2. 
 78. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) 
(finding no independent fiduciary duty of good faith that is separate from care and loyalty). 
 79. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 80. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987). 
 81. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
 82. Id. at 711. 
 83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2005). 
 84. See id. § 102(b)(7)(i). 
 85. Corporations have their roots in medieval England, where the monarchy alone could 
charter a corporation, allowing the organization to exist beyond the life of the parties to an 
agreement. See 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 40 (London, J. 
Butterworth 1793). 
 86. The partnership can be traced back to early English mercantile courts in the form of 
the societas, an early form of business enterprise. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. 
SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW & PRACTICE:  GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 1:2 
(2012).  Societas had similar characteristics to partnerships:  the right to an accounting 
between partners, the agency relationship between partners to act on behalf of the 
partnership, and liability of each partner for the obligations of the partnership. See id. 
 87. See id.; EUGENE ALLEN GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS, 
INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 1 (1911). 
 88. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914) § 6(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 393 (2001); see also 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) § 101(6), 6 U.L.A. 61 (2001). 
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behalf of the partnership, as each has the power to act on its behalf,89 and 
all partners are liable for its obligations.90 
The innovation of the limited partnership was to limit such liability to the 
general partners.91  A limited partnership consists of an association of at 
least one general partner and one limited partner.92  While the general 
partner continues to be personally liable for the obligations of the 
partnership,93 the limited partners are liable only to the extent of their 
capital contributions.94  With this protection, they relinquish direct control 
over the management of the partnership.95  Like the relationship between a 
corporation’s board and its shareholders, the general partner manages the 
business for the limited partners.96  Partnerships are also attractive business 
forms because they have significant tax benefits compared to 
corporations.97 
2.  Limited Liability Companies 
The LLC is a relatively new option for business organization.98  A hybrid 
form, it developed from a variety of sources, including limited partnerships, 
business trusts, and statutory close corporations.99  The Delaware LLC Act 
is modeled on the Delaware LP Act, and the two statutes contain 
 
 89. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 86, § 1:2. 
 90. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) § 306(a), 6 U.L.A. 117 (2001). 
 91. See DEMOTT, supra note 51, at 492; GILMORE, supra note 87, at 592–93.  The 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act was created in 1916. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1916) 
(superseded 1976), 6B U.L.A. 405 (2008).  Delaware has now also authorized limited 
liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs). See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-1001 (2005 & Supp. III 2012) (requirements for formation of LLP); 
id. § 17-214 (limited partnerships as limited liability limited partnerships). 
 92. Id. § 17-101(9). 
 93. Id. § 17-403(b) (stating that general partners have the liabilities of partners under the 
Delaware Uniform Partnership Act). 
 94. See id. § 17-303(a). 
 95. Id. (“A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless 
. . . he or she participates in the control of the business.”).  There are, however, several 
exceptions enumerated in the statute. Id. § 17-303(b)(1)–(10) (listing activities that do not 
constitute participating in control of the business within the meaning of section 17-303(a)). 
 96. See id. § 17-403(a) (stating that general partners have the rights and powers of 
partners under the Delaware Uniform Partnership Act). 
 97. See ROBERT J. HAFT & PETER M. FASS, TAX-ADVANTAGED SECURITIES HANDBOOK 
§ 2A.01 (1997) (pass through taxation).  Partners can also benefit from partnership losses 
because losses also pass through and therefore can be used as deductions for individual 
partners. See I.R.C. § 469 (2006) (passive activity losses); see also infra note 102 and 
accompanying text. 
 98. 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.06 (1992) (discussing the emergence and history of LLCs); see 
also Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1459 (1998).  The LLC was approved for partnership taxation by the I.R.S. in 1988. See 
Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 361; see also 1 CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:  TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 1.01[1] (2005).  The Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act was passed in 1992. Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del. 
Laws 1329 (1992) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109). 
 99. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 1.06; 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra 
note 98, ¶ 1.01[1]. 
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substantially identical wording.100  The primary characteristics of LLCs are 
that they are taxed as partnerships, members and managers all enjoy limited 
liability, and the relationship of the members, managers, and entity is 
governed by the operating agreement.101 
Limited liability companies thus combine corporate limited liability with 
partnership tax advantages102 and governance flexibility.103  Unlike a 
limited partnership, the LLC does not need to have any general partners,104 
and it can have a centralized or decentralized management structure, with 
members and managers maintaining limited liability whether or not they 
participate in control of the business.105 
3.  Operating Agreements Are Contracts 
The nature and structure of each individual LP and LLC, are largely 
dependent on the operating agreement.106  Both statutes provide only the 
contours of the entities, giving parties the “broadest possible discretion in 
 
 100. See Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, Delaware Limited Liability Companies, in 
2 DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.3 (R. Franklin 
Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., Supp. 2011). 
 101. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 1.02; Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 
100, § 20.4. 
 102. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 2.02; Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 
100, § 20.1.  The development of business association forms has been largely driven by two 
goals:  minimizing taxes and limiting personal liability. See, e.g., Hamill, supra note 98, at 
1463–64.  Historically, the two options were corporations, which provided limited liability 
but were taxed in their own right—known as double taxation—and limited partnerships with 
the general partner as a corporation, which provided limited liability and single taxation, 
since partnerships are not taxed in their own right. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
The other possibilities for minimizing taxes are S Corporations and zeroing out a regular 
C Corporation. 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, ¶ 1.01[2][b]–[c].  While 
S corporations also offer flow-through taxation, the LLC is less restrictive. Id. ¶ 1.01[2][b]; 
see I.R.C. § 704(a)–(b) (2006).  Even when successful, zeroing out does not provide any of 
the other advantages of pass-through tax status. 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, 
¶ 1.01[2][c]. 
  At first, the I.R.S. required that the LLC lack two corporate characteristics, and if it 
did not, it would be taxed as a corporation. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, 
§ 16.12, at 39.  This changed with the advent of “check-the-box” classification, and the IRS 
began taxing LLCs as partnerships even if the entity otherwise resembled a corporation. Id. 
§ 16.03.  The federal tax regulations, known as the “check-the-box” rules, became effective 
on January 1, 1997. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (1996). 
  Note that publicly traded LLCs and LPs lose the partnership status for tax purposes 
and are instead taxed as corporations. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006).  The exception to this rule 
occurs when at least 90 percent of the LLC or LP’s income is generated from passive asset 
management activities, such as collecting interest, dividends, rent on real property, or 
particular oil, gas, timber, and other natural resources activities. See id. § 7704(c)–(d). 
 103. LLCs are not constrained by corporate formalities or boards of directors required by 
statute. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 2.02.  LLCs also lack the financial 
constraints that corporations have, which place limitations on the dividends corporations can 
distribute. Id. § 1.03. 
 104. Id. § 1.04. (“Because the members of LLCs have limited liability . . . LLC statutes 
usually protect creditors through rules regarding disclosure, distributions, and dissolution 
that are not waivable in an agreement solely among the members.”). 
 105. Id. § 1.05. 
 106. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 & n.27 (Del. 1999). 
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drafting their . . . agreements.”107  In addition, both the LP Act and the LLC 
Act explicitly incorporate the principle of freedom of contract.108  The 
statutes read, “It is the policy of [the LLC Act] to give the maximum effect 
to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited 
liability company agreements.”109  This means that Delaware courts will 
enforce the product of the parties’ negotiations,110 as long as the provision 
does not conflict with statutory requirements.111  In other words, “[t]he 
operative document is the limited partnership [or limited liability company] 
agreement and the statute merely provides the ‘fall-back’ or default 
provisions where the partnership [or limited liability company] agreement is 
silent.”112 
C.  Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LPs and LLCs 
The prior section detailed the history and structure of limited partnerships 
and limited liability companies and discussed their similarities.  This 
section will examine the application of fiduciary duties in these entities. 
1.  The Default 
In limited partnerships, the general partner owes fiduciary duties to the 
limited partners.113  The Delaware Court of Chancery has also held that 
when the general partner is a corporation, that corporation’s board of 
directors owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners.114  Limited partners 
generally do not owe fiduciary duties, but they assume fiduciary duties if 
they take an active role in the management of the partnership.115 
In limited liability companies, much the same rules apply.116  Each 
member owes fiduciary duties to the LLC, its investors, and the manager,117 
with one qualification—Delaware courts differentiate between passive 
 
 107. Id. at 291 n.27 (comparing limited liability companies to limited partnerships that 
both have “maximum flexibility”). 
 108. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2005) (explicitly incorporating the 
principle of freedom of contract for LLCs); id. § 17-1101(c) (same for LPs). 
 109. Id. § 18-1101(b); id. § 17-1101(c). 
 110. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 n.33 (Del. Ch. 
May 7, 2008) (“Contractual language defines the scope, structure, and personality of limited 
liability companies.”). 
 111. See Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 290 (“[An LLC] permits members to engage in private 
ordering with substantial freedom of contract to govern their relationship, provided they do 
not contravene any mandatory provisions of the Act.”). 
 112. Twin Bridges Ltd. P’ship v. Draper, No. Civ. A. 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609, at 
*12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2007). 
 113. See Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981). 
 114. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43 (Del. 1991). 
 115. Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 662 (Del. Ch. 2012) (citing Cantor 
Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No. 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at *22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2000)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 
2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001). 
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members and managing members,118 with only managers and managing 
members owing fiduciary duties.119  In addition, Delaware courts have 
found that “controlling members in a manager-managed LLC owe the 
traditional fiduciary duties that directors and controlling members in a 
corporation would.”120 
2.  Elimination Permitted 
As discussed above, fiduciary duties in general partnerships, trusts, and 
corporations are part of the structure of those entities and cannot be 
waived.121  The same is not true of Delaware limited partnerships and 
limited liability companies.122  At first, this flexibility was limited to 
expansion or restriction of fiduciary duties.123  In Gotham Partners, L.P. v. 
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that 
while parties to a limited partnership could expand or restrict fiduciary 
duties, they could not fully eliminate them.124  In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court reasoned that it could not override the doctrinal 
importance of fiduciary duties in Delaware business law, and it emphasized 
the “underlying general principle in [Delaware] jurisprudence that 
scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties is normally expected.”125 
In 2004, the Delaware General Assembly amended the Delaware LP and 
LLC Acts to explicitly permit parties to eliminate fiduciary duties.126  The 
Delaware Limited Partnership Act now provides, 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties 
(including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner 
or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership 
agreement . . . .127 
 
 118. Feeley, 62 A.3d at 662 (“Under the LLC Act, there are two basic types of members:  
members who are also managers and exercise managerial functions in a member-managed 
LLC, and members who are passive investors like limited partners.” (citations omitted)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *1, *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 
2010). 
 121. See supra notes 48–50, 65–84 and accompanying text. 
 122. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005) (permitting expansion, restriction, or 
elimination of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (same in limited 
liability companies); cf. supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text (discussing the 
constraints of the corporate form). 
 123. See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167 
(Del. 2002). 
 124. See id. at 167. But see Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(stating that the Limited Partnership Act “apparently [allows] broad license to enhance, 
reform, or even eliminate fiduciary duty protections”). 
 125. Gotham Partners, 817 A.2d at 167. 
 126. See 74 Del. Laws 612 (2004) (amending the LLC Act); id. at 589 (amending the LP 
Act). 
 127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (emphasis added). 
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The relevant language of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act is 
identical.128 
Again recall that corporations can never eliminate fiduciary duties.129  
Corporations can adopt charter amendments exculpating directors from 
liability for breach, but only for breaching the duty of care130—never for 
liability arising from breaching the duty of loyalty.131  Like corporations, 
LPs and LLCs can exculpate their fiduciaries from all monetary liabilities 
for breaches of all fiduciary duties,132 but unlike corporations, they can 
completely remove fiduciary duties in the first place.133 
Even total exculpation of fiduciaries’ liability may leave a remedy extant: 
By limiting or eliminating the prospect of liability but leaving in place the 
duty itself, [such] a provision . . . restricts the remedies that a party . . . 
can seek.  Monetary liability may be out, but injunctive relief, a decree of 
specific performance, rescission, the imposition of a constructive trust, 
and a myriad of other non-liability-based remedies remain in play.134 
Elimination of all fiduciary duties, however, arguably leaves no remedy for 
manager misconduct.135  The Delaware Supreme Court has upheld these 
provisions even when the LLC was publicly traded.136 
a.  Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The remaining statutory safeguard against manager misconduct, 
assuming all fiduciary duties have been eliminated, is the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.  Both statutes state that “the partnership 
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.”137  The implied covenant is a contractual principle that 
inheres in every contract,138 and it likewise applies in LP and LLC 
 
 128. Id. § 18-1101(c) (“[D]uties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by 
provisions in the limited liability company agreement . . . .”). 
 129. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text. 
 132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (“[A] limited liability company agreement 
may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith 
violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); id. § 17-
1101(f) (same for partners and partnership agreement). 
 133. See id. §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c). 
 134. Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 664 (Del. Ch. 2012) (citing Arnold v. Soc’y 
for Savs. Bancorp, Inc. 678 A.2d 533, 541–42 (Del. 1996) (interpreting the effect of a 
similar exculpatory provision under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7))); Leslie v. 
Telephonics Office Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 13045, 1993 WL 547188, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 
1993) (same); see also Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1011 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(considering a plaintiff’s complaint seeking to enjoin the proposed merger). 
 135. See Feeley, 62 A.3d at 664. 
 136. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2008). 
 137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d).  The relevant section of the LLC Act again 
contains identical language. See id. § 18-1101(c). 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
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agreements.139  It is a mechanism that courts use to protect an agreement 
between parties, and it is only applied to matters not explicitly addressed in 
the agreement.140 
The implied covenant is not intended to do more than protect “the spirit 
of what was actually bargained and negotiated for.”141  The implied 
covenant is applied when one party has acted “arbitrarily or unreasonably, 
thereby frustrating the fruits of the bargain that the asserting party 
reasonably expected.”142  The covenant does not impose separate duties, 
and therefore, to successfully argue that the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing implies extracontractual responsibilities, the plaintiff must 
identify specific contractual provisions on which his claim is based.143 
3.  What Remedy If Silence? 
It has not been entirely clear whether fiduciary duties apply as a default 
to LPs and LLCs in absence of language in the operating agreement that 
states otherwise.144  The Chancery has repeatedly affirmed the existence of 
default fiduciary duties,145 but the Delaware Supreme Court has not ruled 
on the issue, and there were some indications that, if the court were to 
address such an issue, it might not find default fiduciary duties to exist.146 
A recent episode of the dialogue between the Supreme Court and the 
Chancery on this subject occurred in Auriga Capital v. Gatz Properties.147  
Though the Chancery has repeatedly held that default fiduciary duties 
apply, Auriga Capital is notable because it is the first time the Chancery 
discussed the topic in some depth.148  Its conclusion was a resounding 
 
 139. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c).  For further discussion of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing’s scope in the alternative entity context, see 
Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied 
Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 
1469 (2005). 
 140. Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC, 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citing Dave 
Greytak Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 23 (Del. Ch. 1992)). 
 141. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
May 7, 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 142. Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting 
Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013); see also Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga 
Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012) (disagreeing with the lower court’s 
interpretation of identical language). 
 145. See, e.g., Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-CS, 
2011 WL 3505355, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) (holding the general partner liable for 
breaching her fiduciary duties because no provision in the partnership agreement modified 
traditional fiduciary duties); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (“[The] LLC agreement does not explicitly alter those default fiduciary 
duties and . . . consequently, [the] managers and controlling members owe Plaintiff the 
traditional duties of loyalty and care.”); see also Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 
660 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting the “long line of Chancery precedents holding that default 
fiduciary duties apply”). 
 146. See Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1206. 
 147. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 839. 
 148. Id. at 849–56. 
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statement that, “where the core default fiduciary duties have not been 
supplanted by contract, they exist.”149 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court, referring to the Chancery’s 
position on default fiduciary duties, said such a discussion was “dictum 
without any precedential value.”150  The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed 
the Chancery’s holding but did so “exclusively on contractual grounds.”151  
As in previous cases that were appealed on this issue,152 the Delaware 
Supreme Court found that the circumstances in Auriga Capital did not 
require directly addressing whether default fiduciary duties applied and, 
therefore, did not require addressing whether default fiduciary duties 
existed.153 
A few weeks later, in Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, the Chancery reaffirmed 
its prior rulings regarding the existence of default duties.154  In Feeley, the 
existence of default fiduciary duties was directly presented to the court—
this ruling was not dictum.155  Given the insistence and length of the 
Chancery’s discussion in Auriga Capital,156 the strength of the Supreme 
Court’s disagreement on the appeal,157 and the contractual bent of Justice 
Steele’s private writings on the topic,158 practitioners seem to have been 
 
 149. Id. at 852. 
 150. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1218. 
 151. Id. at 1214. 
 152. Of the dozen or so cases addressing breach of fiduciary duties in LPs and LLCs 
since the amendment in 2004, few have been appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749 (Del. 2011); Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 
(Del. 2008). 
 153. See Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1206 (finding defendant breached contractually stipulated 
duties); William Penn P’ship, 13 A.3d at 749 (finding parties agreed that traditional 
fiduciary duty analysis applied); Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010) (finding 
defendants had merely exercised a contractual right, which did not implicate any equitable 
analysis); Wood, 953 A.2d at 136 (finding defendant’s conduct was exculpated by the 
relevant agreement to the extent that it was not fraudulent or illegal). 
 154. See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 659 (Del. 2012); see also David 
Marcus, Laster Has Strine’s Back, DEAL PIPELINE (Dec. 3, 2012, 4:19 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/laster-has-strines-back.php (discussing Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s opinion in Feeley and the dialogue between Chancellor Strine and 
Justice Steele regarding default fiduciary duties).  In Feeley, a managing member of a real 
estate investment firm organized as a Delaware LLC was alleged to have acted grossly 
negligently and to have taken business opportunities that belonged to the company. Feeley, 
62 A.3d at 653–54.  The Chancery found there to be no “contractual obligation in the 
Operating Agreement that would require . . . exercis[ing] due care or abjur[ing] intentional 
wrongdoing,” id. at 659, but the court still denied the motion to dismiss the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. Id. at 666. 
 155. See id. at 660.  No appeal was filed. 
 156. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 849–56, 855 
n.65 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
 157. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in 
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 
(2009) [hereinafter Steele, Freedom of Contract] (disputing the necessity of default fiduciary 
duties for LPs and LLCs); Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in 
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 
(2007) (same). 
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justified in being wary of relying on default fiduciary duties.159  This 
discussion seems also to have motivated the General Assembly to amend 
the relevant statute.160 
a.  Statutory Interpretation 
The full provision permitting elimination of fiduciary duties reads: 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties 
(including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner 
or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership 
agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.161 
From one perspective, this provision establishes default fiduciary 
duties.162  The statutes read that fiduciary duties can be “expanded or 
restricted or eliminated.”163  Logically, these duties must exist as a default 
in order for that language to make sense.164  The statutes also presuppose 
the existence of default fiduciary duties in the language referring to duties 
“at law or in equity.”165  This language incorporates the long history of 
fiduciary duties existing at common law, particularly in the partnership 
context.166  Moreover, both Acts specify that when in doubt, equity 
governs.167  Because fiduciary duties are equitable doctrines, such a 
provision would seem to lend force to a reading of the statutes that finds 
that default fiduciary duties are statutorily imposed.168 
From another perspective, the provision abrogates default fiduciary 
duties.169  Both Acts include a codification of the principle of freedom of 
 
 159. See, e.g., Paul D. Ginsberg et al., Delaware Supreme Court Interprets Contractual 
Fiduciary Duties of LLC Manager As Requiring Entire Fairness Review, PAUL WEISS 
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.paulweiss.com/practices/transactional/mergers-acquisitions/
publications/delaware-supreme-court-interprets-contractual-fiduciary-duties-of-llc-manager-
as-requiring-entire-fairness-review.aspx?id=11824 (“Following [Auriga II], the question of 
whether the Act imposes fiduciary duties on parties to an LLC agreement by default remains 
an open issue under Delaware law.”). 
 160. See infra Part I.C.3.b. 
 161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005). 
 162. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 850 n.34 (Del. 
Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
 163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c). 
 164. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 850 n.34. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 659–63 (Del. Ch. 2012) (discussing 
fiduciary duty precedent in the LLC and LP context). 
 167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1105 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter . . . 
the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.”); id. § 18-1104 (incorporating substantially the 
same language). 
 168. See Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 849, 852 (“The statute incorporates equitable principles.”). 
 169. See Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1219 (Del. 
2012); supra note 158. 
1034 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
contract,170 and they further include a provision that “[t]he rule that statutes 
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no 
application to this chapter.”171  Taken together, these provisions could be 
read as permitting the freedom of contract policy to override the common 
law tradition of fiduciary duties.172  According to this reading of the 
statutes, no duties exist unless written in by the parties.173 
b.  New Legislation 
Perhaps in response to this confusion, the Delaware General Assembly 
recently amended the LLC Act, explicitly establishing that fiduciary duties 
govern where not otherwise addressed by the statute.174  The text of the 
amendment reads, “In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of 
law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary 
duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”175  The General Assembly did 
not amend the LP Act, which, as noted before, had previously contained 
identical language on the applicability of fiduciary duties.176 
The synopsis of the bill states that the amendment serves to confirm 
circumstances in which fiduciary duties apply even when not explicitly 
addressed in the operating agreement.177  One such circumstance, the 
synopsis notes, is “a manager of a manager-managed limited liability 
company[, who] would ordinarily have fiduciary duties even in the absence 
of a provision in the limited liability company agreement establishing such 
duties.”178  Assuming courts will take this statement into account when 
interpreting the language of the amendment itself, this amendment still 
leaves open whether default duties apply in member-managed LLCs and 
LPs.179 
4.  Operating Agreements in Practice 
This section explores courts’ treatment of fiduciary duties in LLC and LP 
operating agreements. 
 
 170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(c), 18-1101(b) (“It is the policy of this chapter to 
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”). 
 171. Id. §§ 17-1101(b), 18-1101(a). 
 172. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 227 (“[I]mplicit in the sections 
above, the statutes do not provide any fiduciary duties, default or mandatory.”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013). 
 175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (emphasis added). 
 176. See id. §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c). 
 177. H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
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a.  Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual Modification 
When fiduciary duties are operating, they can invalidate an explicit 
contractual provision.180  In Paige Capital Management, LLC v. Lerner 
Master Fund, LLC, the partnership agreement did not address fiduciary 
duties,181 and therefore the court found the manager of the fund owed 
default fiduciary duties to the fund and its investor.182  The plaintiff, the 
fund’s only investor, sought to withdraw its capital under an early 
termination option.183  The manager attempted to keep the capital in the 
fund, pursuant to a provision limiting withdrawals of certain percentage 
interests in the fund.184  While a strict literal reading of the provision 
arguably permitted the hedge fund manager to keep the investor’s money in 
the fund, the court found reliance on such a provision to be a breach of the 
manager’s fiduciary duty to the investor.185 
The court invalidated reliance on the provision,186 finding that “the 
[general partner’s] reading of the Partnership Agreement was not that of a 
good faith fiduciary grappling with the meaning of an ambiguous 
partnership agreement, but of self-interested minds bent on protecting their 
own financial interests.”187  The court also noted that it was not a credible 
scenario that a first-time hedge fund manager would be able to negotiate a 
clause that permitted her to hold the investor’s capital in order to maintain 
her income if she could not raise other capital.188  The court found it 
“reasonable to conclude that the [investor] would have walked away 
immediately” had the manager insisted on such a clause.189 
   
 
 180. See Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502 CS, 2011 WL 
3505355, at *34 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 181. Id. at *31 (“[T]here is no provision of the Partnership Agreement that says that Paige 
General Partner does not owe fiduciary duties to the Fund and its investors.”). 
 182. See id. (“As a matter of default law, Paige General Partner clearly owes fiduciary 
duties to the limited partners in the Hedge Fund.”). 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *34. 
 186. Id. at *35. 
 187. Id. at *34; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(e) (2005). 
 188. Paige Capital, 2011 WL 3505355, at *34. 
 189. Id. 
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b.  No Fiduciary Duties, Only What Is in the Contract 
If default fiduciary duties do not exist, or if they have been fully 
eliminated by contract, the result is a contract that has almost no 
extracontractual constraints on it.190  In Nemec v. Schrader, a claim was 
brought under a Stock Plan,191 pursuant to which two former employees 
had put rights to sell their shares back to the company within two years of 
retirement.192  Under the contract, if they did not exercise those rights, the 
company then could retire their stock.193  Neither former employee 
exercised the right, and the company retired the stock.194  This happened 
just months before a merger which would have made the stock much more 
valuable to the employees.195 
Did the company have a duty to tell the employees about the possibility 
of a valuable upcoming merger before the expiration of the time period 
when they could exercise their put rights?196  The plaintiffs thought so, but 
a majority of the Delaware Supreme Court did not.197  The court reasoned 
that there was no fiduciary duty claim because the claim arose “from a 
dispute relating to the exercise of a contractual right—the Company’s right 
to redeem the shares of retired non-working stockholders.”198  The court 
refused to override the express provisions of the contract by invoking either 
fiduciary duties or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.199 
Justice Jacobs, writing for the dissent, disagreed with the idea that just 
because defendants had bargained for the right to redeem the shares, every 
possible exercise of that right was permitted.200  He reasoned, “The grant of 
an unqualified contractual right is not, nor can it be, a green light that 
authorizes the right holder to exercise its power in an arbitrary or 
unreasonable way.”201 
Not all courts seem to share the sentiment expressed by Justice Jacobs.202  
In Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, the Court of Chancery 
refused to impose a “reasonableness overlay” on the exercise of a 
negotiated right.203  Two LLCs had gone into business together to develop 
 
 190. Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“When parties 
exercise the authority provided by the LP Act to eliminate fiduciary duties, they take away 
the most powerful of a court’s remedial and gap-filling powers.”). 
 191. Nemec v. Schrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1129 (Del. 2010). 
 192. Id. at 1123. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1124. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1126. 
 198. Id. at 1129. 
 199. Id. at 1126, 1129. 
 200. Id. at 1132 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 201. See id. (citing Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade, No. 2822-CC, 2008 WL 4182998, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2008)). 
 202. See, e.g., id. at 1126, 1129 (majority opinion); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 
3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008). 
 203. Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010). 
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land in Snowmass, Colorado.204  One LLC claimed the other had breached 
its fiduciary duties to the joint business by refusing to consent to proposals 
that the first thought would make the business successful but that the 
second thought would require each to contribute too much capital.205  The 
court found that both LLCs had “contractually bargained to remain free to 
give or deny [their] consent.”206  Because the agreement was “plainly 
written” and had “no lack of clarity,” the court refused to imply 
conditions.207 
Another case where the parties had explicitly eliminated all fiduciary 
duties is Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal.208  In Fisk Ventures, the parties 
formed a biomedical technology company as an LLC.209  They designed the 
governance structure of the company to require a supermajority vote of the 
board for all essential decisions.210  When the Class A members sued the 
Class B members for refusing to agree to a proposed financing plan, 
arguably causing the company to fail, the court found the Class B members’ 
refusal to cooperate to be a bargained-for right, not a breach of duty, and 
dismissed the claim.211 
The relevant contractual provision read, “No Member shall have any duty 
to any Member of the Company except as expressly set forth herein or in 
other written agreements.”  The court considered this an explicit elimination 
of fiduciary duties and found no contractual provision imposing any “code 
of conduct”—no requirements about the exercise of their bargained-for 
right.  The implied covenant could not function to imply fiduciary duties 
since they had been eliminated in negotiation.212 
c.  The “Conclusively Presumed” Cases 
The extent to which judicial intervention can be contractually eliminated 
is illustrated in a series of cases involving a conclusive presumption in a 
contract.213  A combination of provisions in the operating agreements 
addressing conflicts of interest and provisions for reliance on professional 
opinions seemed to lead to the elimination of plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty and 
implied covenant claims.214  These cases were brought by holders of 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *3. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at *6. 
 208. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1, *9 (Del. Ch. 
May 7, 2008). 
 209. Id. at *2. 
 210. Id. at *1. 
 211. Id.; see also Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P., No. 3148 VCN, 2012 WL 
1564805, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012). 
 212. Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11. 
 213. See, e.g., Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., No. 5526-VCN, 2011 WL 4599654, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), aff’d, 67 A.3d 369 (Del. 2013). 
 214. See, e.g., In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., No. 6301-VCP, 2012 
WL 1142351, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2012); Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, No. 
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publicly traded units of limited partnerships.215  The plaintiffs were 
challenging merger transactions on the grounds of a duty of loyalty 
violation.216 
Each partnership agreement had a provision governing the resolution of 
conflicts: 
[W]henever a potential conflict of interest exists or arises between any 
Affiliate of the Company, on the one hand, and the Company or any 
Group Member, on the other, any resolution or course of action by the 
Board of Directors in respect of such conflict of interest shall be permitted 
and deemed approved by all Members, and shall not constitute a breach 
of this Agreement . . . or of any duty existing at law, in equity or 
otherwise, including any fiduciary duty, if the resolution or course of 
action in respect of such conflict of interest is (i) approved by Special 
Approval, (ii) approved by the vote of holders of a majority of the 
Outstanding Common Units (excluding Common Units held by interested 
parties), (iii) on terms no less favorable to the Company than those being 
generally available to or available from unrelated third parties or (iv) fair 
and reasonable to the Company, taking into account the totality of the 
relationships between the parties involved (including other transactions 
that may be particularly favorable to the Company).217 
Even if default duties existed, the effect of this provision was to preclude 
any breach (contractual or otherwise) if any of these four tests were met.218  
The primary element at issue in these provisions was the Special 
Approval.219  The Chancery has held that merely obtaining Special 
Approval does not necessarily result in a judgment for the defendants,220 
insisting that this process remains governed by the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.221 
 
5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012), aff’d in part, 67 A.3d 400 (Del. 
2013). 
 215. See, e.g., In re Encore Energy Partners L.P. Unitholder Litig., No. 6347-VCP, 2012 
WL 3792997, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012). 
 216. See id. at *3; In re K-Sea, 2012 WL 1142351, at *1; Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *2; 
Brinckerhoff, 2011 WL 4599654, at *4; Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1011 
(Del. Ch. 2010); see also supra Part I.A.2.b (discussing the duty of loyalty). 
 217. In re Atlas Energy Res. LLC, No. 4589-VLN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2010) (alterations in original) (emphasis added).  Substantially identical language 
was at issue in In re Encore, 2012 WL 3792997, at *9, Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1020, In re K-
Sea, 2012 WL 1142351, at *7, and Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *9.  Brinckerhoff similarly 
involved actions of a Special Committee. See Brinkerhoff, 2011 WL 4599654, at *9. 
 218. See Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *10 (citing Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1020). 
 219. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.  A Special Committee is often used by 
boards of directors as a method of maintaining independence in decisionmaking and thus 
obtaining the protection of the business judgment rule. See generally 1 WELCH ET AL., supra 
note 66, § 141.2.3.5 (discussing the use of committees in approving conflicted transactions).  
The board delegates the decision to a committee comprised of disinterested directors who 
then review the transaction and vote on it, binding the entire board to the result of that vote. 
See id.  In this way, the committee functions as a proxy for arm’s-length bargaining. See id. 
 220. Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1021. 
 221. Id. at 1021–22.  The issue in this case may have been one of pleading.  The court 
notes, “The complaint cites conflicts faced by directors who did not serve on the Audit 
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The Special Approval in these agreements was novel in that all contained 
a provision providing, 
[The general partner] may consult with legal counsel, accountants, 
appraisers, management consultants, investment bankers and other 
consultants and advisors selected by it, and any act taken or omitted to be 
taken in reliance upon the opinion (including an Opinion of Counsel) of 
such Persons as to matters that [the general partner] reasonably believes to 
be within such Person’s professional or expert competence shall be 
conclusively presumed to have been done or omitted in good faith and in 
accordance with such opinion.222 
This provision affords less protection than the relevant Delaware 
corporations statute, pursuant to which the general partner is protected only 
if he relies in good faith on an opinion.223  The partnership agreement 
provided that such good faith is conclusively presumed.224 
The Chancery indicated that the conclusive presumption did not 
necessarily bar an implied covenant claim.225  In Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge 
Energy Co., when a committee of disinterested directors approved a joint 
venture, the court found that because the committee relied on an investment 
banker’s opinion that had found the venture was representative of an arm’s-
length transaction, the general partner was entitled to a conclusive 
presumption of good faith.226  Fiduciary duties had not been explicitly 
contractually eliminated, but the agreement contained clauses exculpating 
the general partner from monetary liability unless it acted in bad faith.227  
The Chancery held that the claim was precluded based on the facts alleged, 
not on the contractual provision itself.228 
 
Committee . . . but does not raise any challenge to the disinterestedness or independence of 
the members of the Audit Committee.” Id. at 1022. 
 222. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11 (emphasis added).  This provision goes further than 
the applicable statutes, which provide: 
A general partner . . . shall be fully protected from liability to the limited 
partnership, its partners or other persons party to or otherwise bound by the 
partnership agreement in relying in good faith upon the records of the limited 
partnership and upon information, opinions, reports or statements presented by 
another general partner of the limited partnership, an officer or employee of the 
limited partnership, a liquidating trustee, or committees of the limited partnership, 
limited partners or partners, or by any other person as to matters the general 
partner reasonably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert 
competence . . . . 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-407(c) (2005) (emphasis added); see also id. § 18-406 
(providing the same protection to members and managers of LLCs). 
 223. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-407(c). 
 224. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11; see also Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., No. 
5526-VCN, 2011 WL 4599654, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), aff’d, 67 A.3d 369 (Del. 
2013); Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1022. 
 225. See Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1022 (“On the present allegations, the grant of Special 
Approval must be conclusively presumed to have been . . . in good faith.” (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 226. Brinckerhoff, 2011 WL 4599654, at *9. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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While the Chancery found that there were situations in which the 
contractual provision did bar an implied covenant claim, the Delaware 
Supreme Court reversed that holding.  In Gerber v. Enterprise Products 
Holdings, LLC and In re K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P. Unitholders 
Litigation, the Chancery found that the plaintiffs had alleged bad faith,229 
absent a conclusive presumption in the contracts at issue.230  Because of the 
contractual provision, in both cases the defendants were entitled to the 
conclusive presumption of good faith.231 
In Gerber, the allegation was that the general partner had acted in bad 
faith when choosing to use the Special Approval process, abusing its 
discretion by taking advantage of the duty limitations in the operating 
agreement.232  The court held that the plaintiff could not “plead that a 
defendant breached the implied covenant when the defendant is 
conclusively presumed by the terms of a contract to have acted in good 
faith.”233 
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that 
plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.234  Relying on a distinction 
between good faith as a fiduciary duty and good faith with regards to the 
implied covenant,235 the court found that since the statute prohibited the 
 
 229. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11. 
 230. See id. at *12 (“Absent contractual modifications, Gerber could plead a breach of the 
implied covenant.”). 
 231. See id.; see also In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., No. 6301-
VCP, 2012 WL 1142351, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2012).  In In re K-Sea, the allegation was 
that the general partner had incentivized the otherwise independent Conflicts Committee 
members to approve the merger. In re K-Sea, 2012 WL 1142351, at *9. 
  The court held that once the committee relied on the expert opinion, it was entitled to 
the contractually stipulated presumption of good faith and no breach of fiduciary duty or 
implied covenant could be alleged. Id. at *9–10.  The court found that approval by the 
Special Approval process in the operating agreement was conclusive and had no requirement 
that it be “fair and reasonable to the Partnership.” Id. at *8. 
  The court went on to say that such reliance would probably benefit unaffiliated 
shareholders. Id. at *10 (“On its own, Section 14.2 endows [the general partner] with 
unfettered discretion to consent to a merger and submit it for unitholder approval.  [The 
conclusive presumption,] however, incentivized [the general partner] to obtain a fairness 
opinion and rely upon it in connection with its approval of the merger.”).  Because the 
unitholders had a right to veto the merger by vote, “to the extent that unitholders are 
unhappy with the proposed terms of the merger . . . their remedy is the ballot box, not the 
courthouse.” Id. at *8. 
 232. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11. 
 233. Id. at *12; see also In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder Litig., No. 6347-
VCP, 2012 WL 3792997, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012) (rejecting claims of bad faith based 
on reliance on an expert opinion that contractually entitled the general partner to a 
conclusive presumption of good faith, even though plaintiffs had alleged that the controlling 
unitholder had intentionally driven down the company’s trading price before proposing the 
merger). 
 234. Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 421 (Del. 2013). 
 235. Id. at 418–19 (“Under a fiduciary duty or tort analysis, a court examines the parties 
as situated at the time of the wrong. . . .  An implied covenant claim, by contrast, looks to the 
past.” (citing ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, 
LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440 (Del. Ch. 2012))). 
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elimination of the implied covenant, the parties intended a conclusive 
presumption of good faith in terms of fiduciary duty.236 
d.  Ambiguity 
The Court of Chancery has stated that the operating agreement must state 
explicitly that fiduciary duties have been waived in order for them not to 
apply.237  When the agreement is ambiguous on the point, the Chancery 
applies traditional contract interpretation rules.238  In Bay Center 
Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, Emery Bay was an LLC 
organized to pursue a joint venture to renovate certain apartment buildings, 
with Bay Center and PKI as its only two members.239  PKI was designated 
the managing member, and Alfred Nevis, in turn, was the sole owner and 
manager of PKI.240  Nevis was alleged to have secretly caused Emery Bay’s 
credit facility to be renegotiated several times to its detriment but to his 
personal advantage.241  Bay Center asserted that such action was a breach 
of Nevis’s fiduciary duties.242 
The relevant operating agreement addressed fiduciary duties, but it was 
not clear as to whether they applied.243  Section 6.1 of the agreement read, 
“The Members shall have the same duties and obligations to each other that 
members of a limited liability company formed under the Delaware Act 
have to each other.”244  Potentially in contradiction to Section 6.1, Section 
6.2 read, “Except for any duties imposed by this Agreement . . . each 
Member shall owe no duty of any kind . . . .”245  As with any ambiguity in a 
contract, the Chancery permitted the claim based on these sections to 
survive a motion to dismiss.246 
   
 
 236. Id. at 419. 
 237. See, e.g., Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *3–4 (finding no explicit alteration of the 
traditional duties of loyalty and care and that therefore the managers and controlling 
members owe those duties); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC Unitholder Litig., No. 4589-VCN, 
2010 WL 4273122, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (finding the same between a controlling 
unitholder and minority unitholders of a publicly traded LLC). 
 238. See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-
VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009). 
 239. Id. at *2. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at *1. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at *8. 
 245. Id. (alterations in original). 
 246. Id. 
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e.  Substitution or Partial Waiver 
There have been few cases that involve restriction, expansion, or 
substitution of fiduciary duties, as opposed to the elimination of them.247  
Auriga Capital is one of them.248  Auriga Capital involved a dispute 
between the controlling member-manager, William Gatz, and the minority 
investors of a Delaware LLC, Peconic Bay.249  Peconic Bay owned a long-
term lease of a golf course owned by Gatz’s family.250  In 2009, Gatz 
arranged for Peconic Bay to be sold to him in what the courts later found to 
be a sham auction,251 leaving the minority members with an aggregate of 
$20,985, a fraction of the company’s true value.252  The minority members 
then filed a claim of breach of fiduciary duties, attempting to hold Gatz 
liable for his conduct.253 
Peconic’s LLC agreement contained two provisions relevant to the 
analysis of the minority members’ breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
Gatz.254  The first, section 15, provided a standard for entering agreements 
with affiliates255: 
Neither the Manager nor any other Member shall be entitled to cause the 
Company to enter . . . into any additional agreements with affiliates on 
terms and conditions which are less favorable to the Company than the 
terms and conditions of similar agreements which could be entered into 
with arms-length third parties, without the consent of a majority of the 
non-affiliated Members.256 
Gatz was an affiliate and never obtained a majority of the minority vote 
approving the transaction.257 
The second, section 16, was a liability exculpation clause, reading: 
No Covered Person [defined to include “the Members, Manager and the 
officers, equity holders, partners and employees of each of the 
foregoing”] shall be liable to the Company, [or] any other Covered 
Person or any other person or entity who has an interest in the Company 
for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or omission 
performed or omitted by such Covered Person in good faith in connection 
with the formation of the Company or on behalf of the Company and in a 
manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of the authority 
 
 247. See, e.g., Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1212 
(Del. 2012). 
 248. See id. 
 249. Id., 59 A.3d at 1212. 
 250. Id. at 1208. 
 251. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 873 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (“[T]he Auction process used by Gatz was a bad faith sham.  The process used was so 
far short of minimally responsible as to render Gatz’s continued defense of it frivolous and 
burdensome.”), aff’d, 59 A.3d at 1206. 
 252. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1212. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 1212, 1216. 
 255. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 857. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. at 856–57. 
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conferred on such Covered Person by this Agreement, except that a 
Covered Person shall be liable for any such loss, damage or claim 
incurred by reason of such Covered Person’s gross negligence, willful 
misconduct or willful misrepresentation.258 
Based on these provisions and Gatz’s egregious conduct, the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery’s ruling that held Gatz liable.259  
While the Chancery had done so on the basis that default fiduciary duties 
applied, since the agreement had not eliminated them, the Delaware 
Supreme Court found Gatz liable on what it said were purely contractual 
grounds.260  The Chancery, employing an equitable interpretation, had 
found the “arm’s length terms and conditions standard” to impose “the 
equivalent of the substantive aspect of entire fairness review, commonly 
referred to as the ‘fair price’ prong.”261  The Chancery essentially imposed 
the fair dealing prong as well, noting that the process “bears importantly on 
the price determination.”262  The court went on to analyze Gatz’s disloyal 
conduct, focusing on the value of the company, and found that he had the 
burden to prove fairness and did not do so.263  Because of its default 
fiduciary duty interpretation, the Chancery Court applied the exculpation 
provision, section 16, to the totality of Gatz’s conduct—not just the auction 
or the question of fair price.264 
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, also imposing the two-
prong entire fairness standard, as articulated in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,265 
on Gatz.266  The Supreme Court did not require a contractual statement 
imposing a “fiduciary duty,” such as “entire fairness standard,” or 
“duty.”267  The court stated that the inquiry was one of function, not of 
form.268  The Delaware Supreme Court analyzed whether the exculpation 
provision covered Gatz’s conduct in the auction.269  Like the Chancery, the 
 
 258. Id. at 858. 
 259. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1216. 
 260. Id. at 1213 (recognizing “the contracted-for entire fairness standard”). 
 261. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 857 (citing Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 
L.P., 795 A.2d 1, 27 (Del. Ch. 2001), aff’d, 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002), and Flight Options 
Int’l, Inc. v. Flight Options, LLC, No. Civ. A. 1459-N, 2005 WL 2335353, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 20, 2005)). 
 262. Id. (citing Flight Options, 2005 WL 2335353, at *7 n.32). 
 263. Id. at 860–73. 
 264. Id. at 873. 
 265. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 266. See Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 856; see also Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. 
(Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1213–1214, 1214 n.27 (Del. 2012). 
 267. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1213 (“To impose fiduciary standards of conduct as a 
contractual matter, there is no requirement in Delaware that an LLC agreement use magic 
words.”). 
 268. Id. (“Viewed functionally, the quoted language is the contractual equivalent of the 
entire fairness equitable standard of conduct and judicial review.”). 
 269. Id. at 1216–18. 
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Delaware Supreme Court found Gatz had acted in bad faith, and both courts 
imposed liability.270 
II.  DEFAULT OR NOT?  THE TRADITIONALISTS VERSUS THE 
CONTRACTARIANS 
Part I described the origins of fiduciary duties and their role in 
corporations.  It went on to give a brief history of the genesis and 
characteristics of LPs and LLCs.  Lastly, it examined courts’ approach to 
fiduciary duties in these entities when analyzing parties’ operating 
agreements.  Part II examines the reasoning regarding default fiduciary 
duties.  It addresses the traditionalist arguments for default fiduciary duties 
and then compares the opposing contractarian arguments. 
A.  There Should Be Default Fiduciary Duties:  The Traditionalists 
Traditionalists advocate default fiduciary duties, focusing on the 
extracontractual nature of fiduciary duties, their grounding in equity, and 
their foundational doctrinal existence in business law.271  Traditionalists 
maintain that to completely eliminate fiduciary duties as the default 
standard of review for general partners or managers runs sharply against 
precedent,272 is founded on an idealistic view of the bargaining and 
contract-formation process,273 and ignores the necessity for regulation of 
manager conduct.274 
Fiduciary duties are hundreds of years old and are foundational to 
partnership law doctrine.275  Traditionalists argue that contractarians ignore 
the rights and responsibilities that arise “when people join their property 
 
 270. See id. at 1216; Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 873 (“The Auction process was not a good faith 
effort to generate bids at a good price for Peconic Bay.  Rather, the sham Auction was the 
culmination of Gatz’s bad faith efforts to squeeze out the Minority Members.”). 
 271. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 54, at 195–96 (discussing the main features of a 
fiduciary relationship); Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into 
Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451, 452 (2006); Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-waivable 
Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 702 (2011). 
 272. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, “They’ve Created a Lamb with 
Mandibles of Death”:  Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 
76 IND. L.J. 271, 282–91 (2001); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the Glue of 
Capitalism:  Exonerating from Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage Other People’s 
Money, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737, 767 (2012). 
 273. Callison & Vestal, supra note 272, at 295, 296 n.125; Johnson, supra note 271, at 
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 274. Kleinberger, supra note 272, at 767; Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in 
Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic 
and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1611–12 (2004). 
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and their efforts in a common business enterprise.”276  The “legal reality is 
that the manager of an LLC or general partner in a partnership is in a 
fiduciary relationship, as Delaware law conceives that relationship.”277  
Traditionalists thus see this movement to contract law as a significant 
departure from established doctrine278 and argue that precedent should not 
be lightly rejected.279 
Traditionalists contend that contractarians rely on a simplistic view of the 
contract formation process,280 which does not incorporate transaction costs 
and certain institutional realities.281  Moreover, traditionalists argue, 
contractarians overestimate not only the prescience of those drafting 
contracts,282 but also the extent to which precision is beneficial.283  
Ambiguity in contracts is likely both necessary and inevitable.284  Fiduciary 
law is left purposely indeterminate so as to confer the judicial flexibility 
required to deal with a variety of situations that might not be encompassed 
in a single rule.285 
Traditionalists also urge the importance of constraining managerial abuse 
of discretion.286  The argument is that abuse undermines both individual 
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 285. See Johnson, supra note 271, at 722 (“The dilemma is the usual one in designing and 
interpreting categorical legal rules.”). 
 286. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 277, at 504–05; Dibadj, supra note 271, at 472 
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investor confidence and the strength of the general economy.287  The 
market alone does not afford sufficient protection.288  A pure contractarian 
approach would impose costs from mismanagement on third parties who 
rely on or transact with alternative entities.289 
B.  There Should Not Be Default Fiduciary Duties:  The Contractarians 
Contractarians contend that limited partnership agreements and limited 
liability company operating agreements should be treated as pure 
contracts.290  They assert that this approach promotes economic 
efficiency291 and that the sophisticated parties that use alternative entities 
can protect themselves through negotiation.292 
Contractarians argue that the benefits of fiduciary duties are outweighed 
by the costs.293  These costs include enforcement,294 impediments to the 
manager’s discretion,295 and litigation of fiduciary duties.296  A reduction in 
agency costs is accomplished through particular governance devices in 
alternative entities that differ from corporate governance:  mandatory 
distributions, limited lifetime ending in mandatory liquidation, and 
managers as owners.297  These serve to align manager and investor 
interests, thus providing the discipline and incentive necessary to minimize 
agency costs.298  Customizablility of fiduciary duties fits with the flexibility 
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of the form that can be tailored to a wide variety of businesses that have 
different structural requirements.299 
Contractarians also worry that implementation of default fiduciary duties 
would distort the parties’ bargain because courts might not do thorough 
enough contract interpretation, and instead rely on fiduciary duties to cover 
any conduct that does not immediately fall within the contract 
provisions.300  Moreover, fiduciary duties are not clearly defined and thus 
keeping some of them but eliminating others might not be fully effective.301  
Contractarians suggest that fiduciary duties should instead be treated as a 
contractual element.302 
Contractarians note that the parties who make use of alternative entities 
are generally sophisticated303 and are involved in the bargaining that results 
in the operating agreement that defines the entity.304  Contractarians reason 
that including or not including fiduciary duties in an operating agreement is 
a “conscious choice,”305 and is not a “rational gap” that needs to be filled 
by the judiciary.306 
III.  DEFAULT FIDUCIARY DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, AND WAIVER 
Part II outlined the debate between traditionalists and contractarians 
regarding the wisdom of requiring default fiduciary duties.  Part III first 
argues that precedent and risk are the same in member-managed and 
manager-managed LLCs and LPs, and therefore default fiduciary duties 
should apply to both.  Part III then recommends a combination of disclosure 
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and signatures be required in order for members and limited partners to 
waive fiduciary duties. 
A.  Statutes and Precedent 
Taking into account both the history of the statutes (including the new 
amendment to the LLC Act) and the history of fiduciary duties at common 
law, default fiduciary duties apply to both LPs and LLCs.307  They apply 
not only to managers and general partners, but also to managing members 
and to controlling unitholders of either.308  While none of these specific 
duties are mentioned in the statutes, the statutes incorporate the lengthy 
legal precedent regarding fiduciary duties.309 
The legislature specifically crafted the statute to permit elimination; it did 
not eliminate fiduciary duties by statute and permit parties to contractually 
provide for them.310  The language in the statute, “parties may expand, 
restrict, or eliminate fiduciary duties,” explicitly contemplates the existence 
of those duties at common law.311  It would be impossible to expand, 
restrict, or eliminate duties that did not exist in the first place.  The debate at 
common law that the 2004 amendment resolved was whether fiduciary 
duties could be eliminated from LPs and LLCs, not whether they existed at 
all.312 
The LP Act specifies that when in doubt, equity governs.313  Fiduciary 
duties are equitable doctrines, and therefore the language indicates that the 
legislature intended default fiduciary duties to be imposed.314  The 
incorporation of fiduciary duties has now been made explicit in the LLC 
Act.315  This statutory emphasis on equitable doctrines and fiduciary duties 
echoes the approach courts have always taken with regard to fiduciary 
duties in business associations.316  Partnerships, business trusts, 
corporations, and LLCs all place fiduciary duties on the manager.317  The 
imposition of these duties continues in current Delaware jurisprudence.318 
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The emphasis in the statutes on the principle of freedom of contract does 
not address the existence of default fiduciary duties.319  Some have seen the 
contractually leaning provisions as an indication that the freedom of 
contract policy overrides the common law of fiduciary duties in these 
entities.320  But the freedom of contract principle in this context refers to the 
ability of the parties to tailor the business to their needs.321  It does not 
eliminate core elements of business organizations.  The LP and LLC 
statutes operate by providing the default but permitting parties to deviate 
from that default if they so agree.322  It is no different for fiduciary duties. 
The statute reads only “[t]o the extent that, at law or in equity, a member 
or manager . . . [has] fiduciary duties.”323  Fiduciary duties are notoriously 
ambiguous and fluid, which likely accounts for the language in the statute 
not specifically identifying the duties that apply, but instead just 
incorporating common law.324  This is particularly important in business 
organizations such as the LP and LLC, which are extremely customizable.  
The fiduciary obligations that are appropriate vary depending on the 
structure that is created by the parties.  If the default duties are unspecified, 
that permits the appropriate level of protection for each individual 
organization, and it permits common law to evolve as the forms continue to 
develop.  It also means that the application of these duties might not always 
be entirely predictable. 
If parties want to limit these fiduciary duties, and in doing so limit the 
risk of unpredictable interpretation by the courts, they can limit those duties 
by contract in the operating agreement.  If they want more protection, they 
can also increase the duties, again by contract.  But then, the protections 
will be contractual terms, and therefore contractual protections.  The point 
of having particular conduct requirements specified contractually is that 
parties can indicate what they want and limit any extraneous fiduciary 
duties that might effectively amend the contract.  By limiting fiduciary 
duties by contract, parties obtain predictability through pure judicial 
enforcement of the agreement. 
B.  Negotiation and Disclosure:  Formal Waiver Required 
This section argues that default fiduciary duties apply in member-
managed LLCs and LPs.  It then goes on to recommend that a combination 
of disclosure and signatures be required to waive fiduciary duties. 
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 320. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 227 (“[I]mplicit in the sections 
above, the statutes do not provide any fiduciary duties, default or mandatory.”). 
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1.  Consequences of Waiver 
The consequences of eliminating fiduciary duties are significant,325 and 
these consequences are a risk assumed by those not managing.326  If the 
parties in Bay Center had waived all fiduciary duties, they would have 
assumed the risk that one of them would secretly renegotiate the LLC’s 
loan to the LLC’s detriment but to that party’s gain.327  The injured party 
would have had no legal recourse unless there was an explicit contractual 
provision prohibiting such conduct.328  Similarly, if the parties in Auriga 
Capital had waived all fiduciary duties, the minority members would have 
had no grounds to hold Gatz liable for the sham auction.329 
These risks apply equally in manager-managed entities and member-
managed entities.  While partial ownership may serve to align manager 
interest with the other members to an extent, it is not enough to make 
fiduciary duties inapplicable.  All the same problems of control on one side 
and lack of information on the other still persist.  Default fiduciary duties 
should therefore exist even in member-managed LLCs and LPs. 
2.  The Importance of Disclosure and Sophistication 
Waiver or limitation of fiduciary duties in LPs and LLCs should be 
focused on disclosure.  The agreement must disclose the level of risk posed 
to members or partners if fiduciary duties are waived or limited, and the 
person assessing the risk must have the capacity to do so.330 
Elimination or limitation of fiduciary duties creates a serious increase in 
risk for members or limited partners.331  Parties might wish to assume such 
risk if they believe they will share in the upside.  But such assumption must 
be bargained for,332 and in order to bargain fairly, it is critical that the risk 
be disclosed and that parties fully understand what rights they are 
relinquishing. 
3.  More Clarity Required 
At the moment, the language required to waive fiduciary protection is 
relatively vague.333  The extent of the waiver can be determined by the 
interaction between several different provisions in the agreement.334  This 
problem can be mitigated through particular contractual requirements.  The 
clause waiving duties should be in all capital letters.  It should be required 
to be signed by all members or partners, and each time a member or limited 
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partner is added, that member or partner must also sign the clause.  This 
provides the court with objective evidence that the bargain was negotiated 
and that parties understood what they were waiving.  Moreover, it serves as 
an additional alert to the parties that they are relinquishing judicial 
protection. 
Unitholders of publicly traded LPs and LLCs are a special situation in 
that they cannot engage in direct bargaining.  Under federal securities laws, 
the fact that fiduciary duties have been fully waived is required to be 
disclosed, but it is not clear that prospective purchasers of these units would 
necessarily understand the significance of this waiver. 
The disclosures therefore should also include specific risk factors 
identifying the consequences of the waiver.335  This type of analysis is 
important because the waiver is not always total:  for example, most 
investors would not understand the effect of entitling a manager to a 
conclusive presumption of good faith for reliance on expert opinions.336  
These additional disclosures would provide the court with evidence that the 
bargain was negotiated, through the market, and that the parties understood 
the consequences of waiver.  While requiring individual signatures would 
be impractical for a public offering, these investors can protect themselves 
through diversification. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note explores recent decisions interpreting operating agreements on 
the issue of fiduciary duties.  Fiduciary duties in Delaware LLCs and LPs 
can be eliminated in the operating agreements.  There has been an ongoing 
debate over whether, and to what extent, default fiduciary duties apply to 
these entities if no contractual language specifically eliminates fiduciary 
duties. 
This Note argues that default fiduciary duties apply to LLCs and LPs, 
including member-managed LLCs and LPs, and it advocates that a 
combination of disclosure and signatures of the members or partners be 
required in order to waive fiduciary duties in these entities.  Such a 
requirement would give courts clearer evidence of waiver, and it would 
alert parties to the significance of such waiver. 
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